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Since its independence, Indonesia has developed fluctuated and uneven. The financial crisis and 
political changes has lead to decentralization in 1999, which has entitled local governments (province 
and regency/municipality) to develop its region autonomously. Surprisingly, it was concern that the 
decentralization will increase the disparities, rather than decrease it. This research uses Indonesia 
disparities in the province level. Using regression analysis we will overview Indonesian provinces 
disparities and poverty rate to overview the economic growth after decentralization. Overall, this 
research aims to shows the economic performance of Indonesia regions and highlight determinant 
factors that impacts poverty rate. This research lays in the Poverty reduction theory and ideology 
within a context of globalization sub-theme because it studies on the approach that Indonesia 
government took to solve disparities and encourages poor regions to advance its development. 
Keyword: decentralization, disparity, economic growth 
 
1. Introduction 
For years regions has asked for more equal development since the severe disparities between 
the western regions with the centre and east regions in Indonesia. Poorer regions had 
expressed their disappointment with the centre government’s development policy, and 
demand larger income transfers and more authority to administrate their region. Following 
financial crisis 1997 and the fall of the New Order regime, Indonesia enters the new political 
order with decentralization as it core. The autonomy system, with economic and cultural 
reasons, leads regions to separate and expanded the number of regions. Before the 
decentralization, Indonesia had 27 provinces and in 2006 it increased to 33 provinces with 
some 300 municipalities/regency.  
The study of disparities has studies has been conducted variously regarded Indonesia regions. 
In Resosudarmo and Viddyattama (2006), it was found that disparities is still severe and the 
were also evidence that the disparities were between regions and within regions (Akira and 
Alisyahbana,; 2002). In addition, studies of other countries show that industrial types (Fan, 
2003), and main economy sector and political order (Shankar and Shah; 2003), effects the 
level of disparities between and within countries. Consequently, theories and econometric 
analysis on regional inequality and convergence also has been develop in the last two decades 
such as Quah (1992), Martin and Sunley (1998), and Barro and Sala-I-Martin (2004),. .  
This study has three empirical studies aim. First this study will show the effect of 
globalization to poverty growth in Indonesia regions. To achieve this goal, the paper will 
present income evolution on provincial data using several inequality methods. Second, to 
examine whether poverty reduction and economic growth are in progress, this paper will use 
the general growth model (convergence theory) as written by Barro (1991) based on panel 
data technique. Last, with decentralization taking place since 2001, we will see to what extend 
devolution in the provinces level has change through these years. Each empirical study will 
examine how it affected disparities and inequality among Indonesia regions. The originality 
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of this paper is that the research links the impact of decentralization to Indonesia province 
economic performance. 
The second section will be on the impact of globalization to poverty, followed by a brief 
description of decentralization system in Indonesia in section three. In the forth section, we 
will conduct the economic analysis on regional growth and inequality after decentralization. 
The last section will conclude the paper.  
 
2. Globalization and Poverty 
The disparity and inequality literature was driven by growth theory in the neoclassic model, 
as develop by Ramsey (1928), Solow (1956), Swan (1956), Cass (1965), and Koopmans 
(1965) (Barro, 1997). The literature continues as in the 1980s, reviving the classic growth 
theory, the economist broaden the neoclassical model with more depth analysis on 
government policies, accumulation of human capital, and technology spillovers effects 
(Romer 1986). In addition, literature on convergence related with growth theory and welfare 
gap in this globalization era also expanded in the last two decades (Barro; 1991, Quah; 1993, 
Esteban; 1994, Pose and Gill; 2004, Petrakos and Pose; 2005).  
Globalisation effects poverty in many ways and usually indirectly. A paper by Nissanke 
(2007) argues that globalization have a non-linear relationship with poverty in many aspects. 
The paper shows the nexus relation as globalization-economic growth-income distribution-
poverty.  
Globalization consists of a set of policies to openness in trade for each country globally. The 
trade liberalization are expected to increase FDI that will amplify the flow of goods and 
capital, that in turn, will contribute to economic growth. The new political theories claim that 
not all countries or regions gain the benefits of trade liberalization (Nissanke, 2007). This fact 
causes income inequality and disparities that will leads to greater disparities in social and 
morality. These means lower education, health budget and infrastructure developments. The 
outputs are low human capital, lower worker productivity and lower long terms growths.  
The main issue is not whether to integrate to global economy b how to integrate with a fine 
foundation and sustainable growth. It should be noted that old fashion trade protection 
policies and patron-client relation between government and private agents could not be used. 
Considering current fact that China and India as the world leaders in manufacturing, the 
challenge is how to improve skill workers, in particular IT related job, so to compete national 
policies has to support education and training. This will be a crucial policy because with the 
two countries has dominate in the labours-intensive industries sectors, the wage structure and 
returns in the industries has been suppressed.  
In addition, while arguing that the Stopler-Samuelson (SS) theorem are “worse than wrong, it 
is dangerous”, Davis and Mishra claims that trade liberalization may only be good if a country 
uses import goods as substitute of domestic product or if comparative advantage occurs 
(Harrisson, 2007). In other words, globalization and trade liberalization may only benefits the 
poor if the country’s abundant factor, that is the poor products, does not have to compete the 
first order effect of trade will be the rise real income of the poor.  
Moreover, globalization is good in a way that it increased economic growth and reduced 
poverty. It is assert that the effect to poverty will depend on how the growth pattern impacts 
the income distribution. The growth pattern should not be treat as growth per se, but should 
be observe as sustainable economic growth and development, so it can have a significant 
effect.  
Because growth is distribution-neutral, government-intervention policies should be 
implemented for the benefit of the poor. With this pro-poor growth distribution, globalization 
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and economic growth may decrease inequality and poverty.  
In this for Indonesia, poverty has decline rapidly from 40.1% in 1976 to 11.3% in 1996, 
before the financial crisis. The most significance poverty reduction occurs during the 1970s-
1980s period with a fall of 13% annually. The poverty rate increase after financial crisis 
peaked at 23.5 % in 1999 and decline to 16.6% in 2004. Compared with other Asian 
countries, Indonesia has a fast poverty reduction between 1990 and 2000 with an average -
8.8%. While China, Philipines, Thailand, and Bangladesh are at -5.4%, -1.3%, -2.1%, and -
2.3%, respectively (Tambunan, 2006).  
To achieve this figure, various attempts have been done to overcome the poverty growth. 
Before decentralization, central government effort was focus on the people, with specific 
development program such as block grants for regions with the underdeveloped regions 
instruction (URI) and urban poverty reduction program (UPRP). After the decentralization, 
the attempt were much more to strengthen local governments such as financial empowerment 
for small and medium enterprise, support program for bank and local government officers, 
and institution improvement to run the local government (Kuncoro, 2004).  
 
3. Indonesia Decentralization 
Following financial crisis in 1997, Indonesian politics shifts from stable centralize regime to 
constantly under attack from many sectors of societies, which pushes democratic reform 
(Seymour, 2002). The movement causes violent and peaked with the end of the “New Order” 
regime. The “Reform” regime starts with region autonomy through the Law No 22/1999 
concerning decentralization, granting regional autonomy and Law No 25/1999 concerning 
fiscal administration between centre and regional governments (Sadli, 2000).  
Decentralisation is formed in three levels, provincial, municipality/regency, and village. 
Municipality and regency are at the same government administration level, a level below the 
provincial government. According to the decentralisation Law No 22/1999, decentralisation at 
the provincial level is in the de-concentration and devolution form, and, municipality/regency 
and village works in the devolution form. Decentralization includes several sensitive sectors 
as central government’s responsibility. Such sensitive sectors are foreign policies, national 
security and defence, national finance, law, religion, macro economy policies and macro 
politic policy. Regions are permitted to all local government function such as transportation, 
health, local economics, and other local region specific sectors (Nurcholis, 2005). The law 
also stated that regions could form cooperation with other organization in a foreign country, 
both public and private owned. These opportunities should to be utilized by region 
governments to develop their local through domestic and international cooperation 
agreements.  
Decentralization government leaders are elected through political election, at the provincial 
level the administrator is a governor and at the municipal/regency level is mayor/head of 
regency. The provincial government, besides administrate its own provincial government 
office, it also coordinates the central government’s agencies within the province such as field 
administration office of education, religion, and port administration. The municipal/regency 
government are responsible to decide political decision such as government laws, regulations, 
and responsible in implementation. The functional office is an autonomous and under the 
municipal/regency government.  
There are two main concerns for the decentralization implementation, the political and fiscal 
issue. The political issue relates with the citizen confidence that the decentralization will give 
improve the social and economic level of the nation, meanwhile the fiscal issue relates with 
the heavily dependence of local government to central government’s fund transfers. For the 
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political problem, government has revised the Law 22/99 and introduced direct election, both 
local executive and legislative. It is assume that direct election will create more accountable 
and responsive local government. In addition, it is also expected to form a more reliable 
parliament.  
From the fiscal issue, it should be noted that there are two main inter-government transfer, the 
general purpose grant (DAU) that gives the full autonomy to local governments in spending 
and managing the grant and the special purpose grant (DAK) the local government will own 
the projects or programs but they will be under the monitoring and evaluation from respective 
central ministries and central ministries will still have the decision on the types of programs 
or projects to be financed. The current issue is that DAU is the main source for the local 
revenue. Comparison between annual growth rate of local own revenue during 1994-1996 
period and 2001-2002 period indicated that prior decentralization growth (20%) is much 
higher than decentralization growth (5%). This should not be viewed as the incompetent local 
government to raise tax, but other consideration should also be taken account. The reason is 
that, local tax such as income and company tax might hurt the local economy activities. 
Beside that, Law 25/1999 and Law 34/2000 does not give significant local taxing power 
because Indonesian decentralization was formed as expenditure-led decentralization financed 
by transfer and the central government limited the local governments tax power. Since the 
execution of Law 25/1999, Indonesia has been a highly decentralized country only in three 
years (Table 1). It is shown that in 2002, the local development values are as much as the 
expenditure value that the central government budget for national development 
(Brodjonegoro, 2003).  
 
Table 1 
Local Expenditure Proportion to Central Government Budget in Indonesia, 2002-2005 
(%) 
 2002  2003  2004  2005  
Local Expenditure/ Central Expenditure 47.19 37.73 42.34 41.93 
Local Expenditure/GDP 7.07 4.93 7.82 8.6 
Local Development Budget / Central 
Development Budget 19.36 10.02 
14.25 
 5.22 
Source: BPS, Author’s calculation 
 
Disparities in Indonesia have been severe compared with other countries, especially since the 
financial crisis in 1997. The decentralization of regional government in 1999 itself recently 
has been viewed to increased the disparities, rather than decrease it. Based on the 
decentralization act 2004, which replace the decentralization act 1999, municipal/regency 
where the natural resources located, earn higher revenue share compared with the province 
government and other municipalities/regencies in the same province.  
This obviously is not surprising since the region has to develop its area based on local 
resources. On the contrary, with higher revenue share, the prosperous regions will experience 
faster economic growth and lead to larger inequality between regions. In addition, higher 
revenue share will permit province government to build infrastructure cross 
municipality/regency, that will benefit the municipality/regency within the province.  
From the Law 25/1999 and its revised comparison summary (Table 2), it can be seen that the 
decentralization has offer more proportional share. The share between the governments 
(centre, province, and municipalities/regency) is based on each regions revenue they generate 
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and also allow them to generate their own revenue (Seymour, 2002). In the Law 25/1999, 
Provinces and Municipalities endowed with natural resources gain more revenue than other 
regions (70-80%) and the share increases 0.5% in the revised law. In addition, in the 
decentralization law, revenue proportion also occurs in economic activities. The larger 
economic activity regions gains more revenue compared with others, but this tax remains the 
same in the revised law. It can be seen that in the long term, decentralization will cause 
disparities between rich and poor regions more significant.  
Table 2 
Comparison Balance Fund: Level of proportion transfer of fund between Central and 
Regional Governments under Law 25/1999 and its revised in 2002 (%) 
Law 25/1999 Revised Law 2002 
Revenue Source 
C M/R C P M/R OM/R 
Natural Resources 20 80 20 16 32 32 
Oil mining 85 15 84.5 3.1 6.2 6.2 
Gas 70 30 69.5 6.1 12.2 12.2 
Income Tax 80 20 80 8 12 - 
Company Tax 100 0 100 0 0 0 
Land and property tax 10 90 10 16.2 64.8 - 
Source: Brodjonegoro, 2003 
C           = Central Government proportion 
P           =Provincial Government proportion 
M/R      = Municipality/Regency Government proportion 
OM/R =Other Municipality/Regency Government proportion, within the same Province where the 
Municipality/Regency are located.  
 
4. Regional Inequality, Decentralization and Poverty 
In the last two decades, the literature on measurement of disparities has been enormously 
published, both in Indonesia (Akira and Alisjahbana 2002; Akira and Lukman 1995; 
Resosudarmo and Vidyattama 2006) and international (Fan and Sun 2008; Pose and Gill 
2004; and Azzoni 2001). With different properties and distinct social welfare functions, it is 
accepted that to measure regional inequality uses variety of methods and compares the result 
(Fan, 2008). There are several methods for disparities calculation: dispersion index, lorentz 
curve, and entropy. In this research, coefficient variation (CV) is the dispersion index that are 
used for its straightforward and ability to describe the variation of the population. To deploy 
the Lorentz curve method, this research use Gini Coefficient calculation. This method 
calculates the distance of the Lorentz curve from the 45° line, the further the Lorentz curve, 
the higher the disparities. Because of the structure, we can use the theil index as entropy 
analysis to decompose analysis to between and within regions. In this paper we use regions as 
Indonesia’s main islands and within regions consist of the provinces located in the island. The 
result of these analysis is given in Figure 1.  
The data that are used in this research are panel data from 26 provinces between 1993-2005, 
gathered from various sources, such as Indonesian Central Statistics Agency (BPS). Despite 
one province has been disintegrate, Timor Timur, and seven new province has been formed, 
this research use the data of 26 province (excluding Timor Timur) and the new province data 
after it was formed are join with the province before it was separated. The first aim of this 
paper is to show the evolution of inequality and disparities between provinces in Indonesia 
during the period.  
The inequality between provinces as given in CV, Theil Index, and Gini Coefficient shows 
similar fluctuation during the period. Following the rapid development in Indonesia in new 
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order regime (1966-1997), between 1975 to 19993 GDP per capita grew 5.5 % annually and 
GDP per capita dispersion (in terms of standard deviation of log GDP per capita) decline from 
0.39 to 0.28 (Garcia and Soelistianingsih, 1998). Later, the decline of disparities shifts to 
disparity increase during the financial crisis in 1997, before it decline again after 2002. The 
Theil index and Gini Coefficient has the relative same fluctuation pace meanwhile the CV 
index residual pace is 1-2 years. 
 
Figure 1 
Inter-provincial Inequality in GDP per capita, 1993-2006 
 
 
For the empirical model, this paper we use two econometric modeling; (1) to estimate the 
existence of convergence between provinces, and (2) to overview the impacts of 
decentralization to poverty growth. The characteristics of variables used in this research are 
given in Table 3.  
 
Table 3 
Statistics of Variables 
Variables Mean Standard Deviation Min Max 
yit 15.54074  .6871616 14.06937 18.06403 
hc it -5.940364  .3133587 -6.600906 -5.311089 
nit -4.187129  .8259493 -9.926922 -1.060191 
hlit -9.927128  .4441054 -12.72818 -8.402621 
cpit 25.37371  .9885576 22.06587 28.46907 
oilgas .1265231  .1900772 0 .7628344 
rev .0295855  .1000843 .0011474 1.756391 
fdi .1161357  .3465964 0 4.543831 
ln revit 27.09117  2.377208 22.94497 40.42202 
decen_ hlit -4.589217  4.971624 -10.57929 0 
decen_ cpit 11.79662  12.78722 0 28.46907 
decen_lnrevit 12.87623     14.03509 0 40.42202 
decen_ lnhcit -2.716732  2.944762 -6.448086 0 
 
Convergence model (β convergence) are used to observe economic growth rate between 
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regions. If we found β convergence has a negative sign, it can be claim that poorer regions 
has more rapid growth than rich regions, which explains that economic convergence is in 
progress. While the β convergence has a positive sign shows that the divergence and 
polarization are occurring between regions economics.  
For the β convergence, the empirical model is as suggested by Resosudarmo and Vidyatamma 
(2006):  
! 
yit " yit"1( )
yit"1
= #
1
+ #
2
ln yit"1 + X 'it # x + Z 'it # z + D't # d +$i + uit
 
(1) 
where the i the province, t is the index of time, yit is GDP per capita, and Dt is a vector of 
year dummy. Following Resosudarmo and Vidyatamma (2006), the model needs the 
individual effect, ηi, to capture all the determinants of growth for various regions in panel 
data analysis. The uit is the random disturbance not to be correlated when the time or region is 
not the same and assume uit2 is constant.  
Meanwhile, the X’it are the vector of variables that are used to understand growth regression. 
The variables is written as X’it= γ3 ln hcit + γ4 ln nit + γ5 ln hlit + γ6 ln cpit; the rate of 
output invested in human capital, the population growth, output invested in health centre, and 
the output invested in physical capital, respectively. In addition, we also include variables of 
interest that are assumed has been shift since the implementation of decentralization in 2001, 
Z’it, including (1) regional revenue, (2) role of revenue share oil and gas as the main natural 
resources, which have main interest in the decentralization law, and (3) foreign investment, as 
a means for spillovers, both technology and human skills. It should be noted that the trade 
variable, which is a common variable in disparities analysis, is not included in the explanatory 
variables because there is no significant difference in trade policies in Indonesia. As been 
described above, if the γ2 are found to be negative, we can assert that there is conditional β 
convergence exist and there is evidence that poorer province has higher growth rate than 
advance province.  
The definition of each variable is given below:  
Provincial income per capita (yit): this is a provincial gross domestic product (GDP) at 1993 
price per capita. Provincial human capital index (hc it): This variable shows the rate of human 
capital in each province. The variable is obtained as the ratio of the number of teacher in the 
secondary school multiply by average rage in the province, divided with the total worker 
multiplied with the same average wage.  
Provincial population growth rate (nit): This data is gathered from BPS and describes the 
population growth annually. Provincial rate of health centers (hlit): This data is a proxy data 
to show the annual growth of investment in health care per province. Provincial capital 
investment (cpit): Following Resosudarmo and Vidyattamma (2006), this data is used as a 
proxy for government capital investment. The data is the ratio fixed capital investment to 
gross domestic product.  
Contribution of oil and gas (oilgas): Describes the role of oil and gas sector to the whole 
provincial economy and it is the ratio of the sector to the total provincial economy value.  
Revenue (rev): the ratio of total revenue that each province achieved with the total GDP in the 
same year. It is assumed that after decentralization, provinces with higher endowment will 
receive higher revenue, which may lead to inequality. Foreign Direct Investment (fdi): The 
variable enables us to overview the impact of foreign capitals to the development of 
provinces. It is the ratio of annual approved foreign investment with the province’s GDP.  
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Table 4 
Results of OLS and Fixed Effect Estimation 
  OLS Fixed Effect 
  Coef t-stat Coef t-stat 
yit-1 -0.02908851** -2.8 -0.26629366*** -8.05 
ln hc it -0.00155222 -0.09 -0.04775173 -1.1 
ln nit -.02603414*** -4.34 -0.01332539* -2.03 
ln hlit -0.0070554 -0.59 0.04683392 1.82 
ln cpit 0.00725169 1.03 0.00834423 0.94 
oilgas 0.10474925*** 3.33 0.51340816*** 3.76 
rev -0.47188331*** -9.88 -0.06022982 -0.87 
fdi -0.00742167 -0.56 0.00373476 0.3 
y1994dummy -0.04978784* -2.24 -0.01882718 -0.92 
y1995dummy -.07601149*** -3.41 -0.0283877 -1.35 
y1996dummy -0.06386057** -2.84 -0.00589906 -0.27 
y1997dummy -0.18821833*** -8.42 -0.00669604 -0.29 
y1998dummy -0.08216582*** -3.58 -0.11021727*** -4.81 
y1999dummy -0.13732984*** -6.06 -.07729948*** -3.4 
y2000dummy -0.0938203*** -4.12 -0.04237424 -1.86 
y2001dummy -0.09665096*** -4.27 -.04441425* -1.98 
y2002dummy -0.08347756*** -3.69 -0.02851448 -1.26 
y2003dummy -0.08173801*** -3.4 -0.02359576 -0.96 
y2004dummy -0.10214897*** -4.4 -0.02967231 -1.18 
y2005dummy -0.04399579 -1.85 0.03280214 1.31 
constant 0.18929752 0.97 4.043768*** 5.41 
R-squared 0.4845   0.5471   
Adj R-squared 0.4492       
*, **, and *** are 10 per cent, 5 per cent, and 1 per cent significance, respectively 
The dependent variable is 
! 
yit " yit"1( )
yit"1
 
This paper use ordinary least square (OLS) and panel data analysis fixed effect (FE) to 
estimate equation (1). To avoid inconsistency of OLS, fixed effect and random effect in panel 
data analysis is deployed. In addition, Hausman test demonstrate that there is significance 
different in fixed effect estimation with OLS and random effect, thus FE is more preferable 
for its consistency (Resosudarmo and Vidyattama, 2006).  
The result (Table 4) from the fixed effect shows the estimation of β convergence is -0.266, 
accepted at a 1 per cent significance level. This explains that with a 99 per cent of confidence, 
we argue that there poor provinces growth rate is higher than province with higher initial 
GDP level. The estimation is controlling for the role of oil and gas revenue rate, overall 
amount of provincial revenue, foreign direct investments, provincial fixed capital investment, 
health centre developments, and annual changes of national macroeconomics condition. The 
human capital and population growth rate also influenced the convergence in a negative 
effect. 
To understand the link between economic growth and poverty, we regress poverty growth 
with several independent variables that are claim contributed. Moreover, to view the effect of 
decentralization, we use the interaction index between the decentralization dummy variable 
with the previous explanatory variables. The following is the equation for poverty growth:  
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! 
ln povertygrowth = "1+ "2lnhlit + "3lncpit + "4 ln revit + "5lnhcit + "6lnnit + uit  
(2) 
Table 5 
Results of Poverty Regression (OLS) 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
  Coef t-stat  Coef t-stat  Coef t-stat 
ln hlit 0.27231399** 2.75     0.21135753 1.88 
ln cpit -0.10694999* -2.2     -0.13597262 -1.77 
ln revit 0.05493073* 2.44     .05827954* 2.23 
ln hcit -0.62875341*** -4.17     -.57267566** -3.31 
ln nit 0.02134491 0.45  0.0494233   0.036421 0.76 
decen_ hlit    0.42534596*    1.01  0.22782894 1.04 
decen_ cpit     -0.05755932 2.17  0.07616824 0.78 
decen_lnrevit     0.0183183 -0.85  -0.04481299 -0.71 
decen_ lnhcit     -.90453299** 0.32  -0.29314501 -0.95 
constant 2.9998406 1.96  2.8880646***  -3.36  3.3859656 1.88 
R-squared 0.2091    0.1059 0.213   0.2424   
Adj R-
squared 0.175 
 
 0.0673 
 
 0.1816  
Obs 338    338    338   
*, **, and *** are 10 per cent, 5 per cent, and 1 per cent significance, respectively 
 
Equation (2) attempt to explain variables that effect poverty rate in Indonesia and the OLS 
regression is deployed with three sets of data. The first model (Table 5), regress the poverty 
rate with control variables for the whole period, shows that all explanatory variable is 
significance, although the sign of the improvement in the number of health centre is as not 
expected. The second model regress the poverty rate with the interaction of explanatory 
variable with decentralization dummy variable. The result shows that decentralization has a 
significant impact to the poverty level with the increasing number of health centre and human 
capital. However, there is no significance evidence that the rise of revenue share, in which 
province gain more revenue share in natural resources and local tax, have an impact to reduce 
poverty in the decentralization era. In all model, the explanatory variables only explain up to 
18.2 % of the variety of the poverty rate level. 
 
5. Conclusion 
To sum up, there are several conclusions that can be drawn from this research. First, this 
paper shows that disparity between provinces in Indonesia is still severe in all calculation. 
The disparities did increase before the financial but then it decline after 2002. Second, the 
convergence analysis explains that poor province has higher GDP per capita growth and 
grows fasters than rich province, with the level of revenue proportion of oil and gas and the 
population growth as the significance determinant. Third, the paper confirms that the level of 
human capital, capital fixed investment, and revenue proportion influences poverty rates. In 
later regression, it was also found that revenue proportion shifts after decentralization did not 
have significance effect, despite the shift of revenue share is the fundamental of 
decentralization law.  
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